Building out from the back via goal kicks is so commonplace in the modern game that it is hard to remember that, until relatively recently, this was regarded as a very high-risk strategy. 

The sight of teams playing across their six-yard box would often be greeted with groans from the stands and managers having to justify their strategy in post-match interviews. 

Now, although the majority of top-level sides still play short and in mostly rehearsed patterns, the trend may be reversing slightly. 

Teams continue to find new ways to build from goal kicks, with an increasing number mixing long and short options to make it more difficult to set up a press. 

This tactical theory analyses recent goal-kick tactics employed by Europe’s top coaches, with examples from Ligue 1, the Bundesliga, and Serie A.

The examples included analyse short goal kicks and goal kicks that are designed to draw the opposition close to the goal before kicking long behind them. 

A practical training exercise that allows coaches to implement these build-up tactics is also included with this tactical football analysis. 

This game-related practice enables coaches to develop patterns and principles for building from goal kicks and to prepare their sides to respond to dangerous turnovers in these scenarios. 

Exploiting The Wide Area From Goal Kicks

The image above shows how Albert Riera set up his side's goal kicks to build out in his debut as manager of Eintracht Frankfurt, in their 1-1 draw at Union Berlin.

In Riera’s first two matches, Frankfurt have lined up for goal kicks in a 4–1 (though in slightly different positions), with 5 players high at the halfway line. 

In both matches against Union Berlin and Borussia Mönchengladbach, Frankfurt have, albeit not exclusively, attempted to exploit the wide areas before getting in behind their opponents. 

As shown in the above image, Frankfurt's goalkeeper takes the goal kick by passing to one of his centre-backs. 

The ball is then quickly switched to the opposite centre-back. 

This switch draws the pressing forwards to one side, forcing them to adjust their run when the ball is passed across them, giving the second receiving centre-back slightly more time on the ball. 

In this instance, the aim is to get the ball to a player in space in the wide area. 

The opposition had read this and changed their pressing structure from the first goal kick, with a full-back starting higher, and jumping to Frankfurt’s right-back when the right centre-back received the ball. 

Frankfurt’s immediate reaction was for their full-back, Rasmus Kristensen, to become inverted, dragging the opposition's left-back inside, and allowing their winger, highlighted at the top of the image, to drop down and receive alone. 

The winger is aided by another attacker, just out of shot, occupying the widest defender, making it hard for the defender to drop down with the winger who receives the ball. 

In this variation of the same idea, to have their winger receive alone in the wide area, Frankfurt had right-back Kristensen start lower and receive the first pass from the goalkeeper. 

This bypassed the two pressing forwards at the edge of their box and tempted the wide-pressing player into a high position, leaving space behind him. 

As the full-back received the ball, the winger dropped down quickly to receive. 

However, due to the speed at which Union Berlin pressed Kristensen, and the angle of the pressing run, which blocked the outside pass to the winger, Frankfurt were trapped. 

With no half-space passing option inside, Kristensen was forced to play backwards to his centre-back, and possession was ultimately lost. 

Frankfurt, now playing in their traditional red-and-black home kits, repeated this play against Borussia Monchengladbach, with far greater success. 

On this occasion, the ball reached the full-back much more quickly from the goalkeeper. 

Support from the wide player, who made a double movement away and then towards the ball, also appeared quicker. 

Despite the opposition once again pressing from the outside in to cut off a pass to the winger, Frankfurt's attacking wide player dropped even deeper to allow an angle for a pass. 

This allowed the left-back to play a one-two with his wide teammate and burst into open space with the ball. 

Also important here is the movement of Frankfurt’s ‘6’ (highlighted).

Not only does his dropping towards the ball help keep his side secure should they lose it, but by becoming an option for the ball, he attracts a pressing player. 

This clears the space for his full-back to attack. 

This move ultimately gave Frankfurt a shot from the edge of the opposition's penalty area.

Playing Short To Go Long 

A common theme in teams playing out from the back from goal kicks in the last several seasons is doing so to attract the opposition's press before putting the ball behind them from a low position. 

The image above shows a recent example of this performed by Olympique de Marseille, now without a permanent manager since the departure of Roberto De Zerbi. 

This was Les Olympiens' first match since parting ways with the Italian after a 5-0 humbling from long-time Le Classique rival PSG. 

Marseille’s set-up is a 4-2-4 with the front four (out of shot) staggered. 

Importantly, one of the two midfield players, Pierre-Emile Højbjerg, is situated in close proximity to the goalkeeper, in a central position just outside the six-yard box.