The excitement does not lie solely in the anticipated clash between the Premier League stars Gabriel Magalhães and Erling Haaland; rather, it extends to other facets of the match as well.

Across their four appearances in this World Cup, Norway have exhibited marked superiority in offensive set-pieces, most notably from corner kicks.

Norway, alongside Bosnia and Herzegovina, hold the distinction of being the tallest team in the tournament, with an average height of 187.2 cm.

This physical attribute, however, is not the sole determinant of their effectiveness in attacking set-pieces.

Norway possess well-devised tactical frameworks for countering diverse defensive setups from corner-kick situations, and these are executed with a high degree of proficiency.

In this World Cup tactical analysis, we will show the diverse tactics of Ståle Solbakken's side in attacking corners against man-marking and zonal-marking systems.

Norway Tactics Vs Man Marking

Starting with their tactics against man-marking, we will analyse a brilliant, simple corner routine against France.

As shown in Figure 1 below, France defend with two zonal defenders (blue), a short-option defender (green), a rebound defender (yellow) and the remaining six are man markers.

Figure 2 highlights Norway's main scheme at attacking corners.

They have five attackers inside the box, three for the second ball on the edge of the box (orange) and a security player at the back (the 10th player is the taker).

The targeted player is in white, targeting the near post on the six-yard line.

Figure 3 shows Norway's idea to free the targeted player, helping him create separation between himself and his marker.

He stands in a distant position within a pack of his teammates while the yellow player pushes his direct marker to make sure he won't chase the targeted man.

This curved run helps the targeted player earn seconds before his man marker, who takes more time because he has to go around the yellow player.

Figure 4 shows that the targeted player has already won time before his man marker, while the green player makes an opposite curved run to the far post to be ready in case the targeted player flicks the ball on.

Caring about the details, two blue players stand alongside their two man markers, acting as a barrier between the goalkeeper and the targeted area to make sure that he won't be able to go out and claim the ball.

In Figure 6 below, all is set, and you can see the targeted player gets the ball while the green player is ready to attack the far post.

Against Iraq, they implemented a similar idea, scoring an important goal.

In Figure 7 below, note their pre-starting position.

They start in a pack on the far post (or even beyond it), moving away from goal, dragging their man markers with them before going back to their normal starting position.

The purpose of this pre-starting position is to make it easy for the targeted player and the one who performs the block for freeing him to create separation between them and their man markers.

Figure 8 below shows the start of the story; Leo Østigård (white) is the targeted player, and Erling Haaland (yellow) is the one who performs the block to free him.

Figure 9 below shows that Leo Østigård starts to retreat back to the normal starting position while Haaland, who knows the plan, reaches next to him before his man marker.

Figure 10 below shows their actual starting position with enough distance to enable Haaland to push his marker and the targeted player's marker, allowing the targeted player to launch free early.

Iraq's two zonal defenders (blue) can't deal with this run because they are stationary while the targeted player comes free-jumping from running, which allows him to have a dynamic advantage.

Figure 11 below shows that they add a player (orange) behind the first zonal defender to make him busy with him, to make sure that he won't retreat to fill the targeted area.

In green, you can find a player running towards the goalkeeper, making it two players having a barrier to prevent the goalkeeper from claiming the ball.

Haaland also has another work to frame the goal after that to be ready for any possible flick, as shown in Figure 12 below.

The plan works, and you can see the usual principle of (framing the goal), which allows them to follow the ball.

However, the result was a direct, headed shot into the net, scoring an important goal.

Instead, this tournament has been defined by the emergence of organised, tactically disciplined underdogs capable of competing with, and eliminating, some of the world’s biggest footballing nations. 

Paraguay’s historic victory over Germany, coupled with the impressive performances of several African sides, has reinforced the growing competitive balance across international football, where physical intensity, tactical flexibility and collective organisation are increasingly outweighing individual reputation.

Germany’s exit serves as a reminder that historical pedigree alone offers no guarantees, while other favourites, including Spain and Portugal, have also faced opponents capable of matching them for long periods of games.

The gap between football’s established powers and emerging nations has never appeared smaller.

In this World Cup data analysis, we examine the tactical and statistical trends behind the underdogs’ success, exploring how they defend, transition, create chances and expose the vulnerabilities of the tournament favourites.

Winning The Ball Before The Battle Begins

One of the clearest tactical trends behind the rise of the tournament’s underdogs has been their ability to regain possession high up the pitch and immediately disrupt opponents’ build-up.

Rather than relying on prolonged spells of possession, several emerging nations have prioritised aggressive pressing schemes, compact defensive distances and well-coordinated counterpressing structures.

Forced Turnovers Vs Ball Recoveries Stats - FIFA World Cup 2026

Paraguay provide the standout example.

Gustavo Alfaro’s side led the tournament with 209 forced turnovers, and that defensive intensity underpinned their historic Round of 32 elimination of Germany. 

Operating from an organised 4-4-2/4-2-3-1 block, Paraguay consistently denied Germany clean progression through central areas before attacking quickly following regains, illustrating how defensive pressure can become an attacking weapon.

A similar pattern emerged elsewhere.

DR Congo, coached by Sébastien Desabre, combined athletic pressing with disciplined defensive organisation to record 85.2 ball recoveries, pushing England to the limit after leading for more than an hour before eventually losing 2-1 to two Harry Kane goals.

Japan also demonstrated the value of structured pressing despite their elimination, ranking among the tournament leaders with 80.59 ball recoveries while repeatedly forcing Brazil into uncomfortable build-up sequences during a narrow 2-1 defeat.

These performances suggest that ball recoveries and forced turnovers have become more than defensive statistics; they are increasingly reliable indicators of tactical competitiveness.

The underdogs may not dominate possession, but they are consistently dictating where, when and how elite opponents are allowed to play.

Defending Without The Ball, Controlling The Game

Paraguay’s famous victory over Germany was not built on deep defending alone, but on a remarkably proactive defensive performance that repeatedly disrupted one of the tournament favourites.

Gustavo Alfaro’s side combined an organised 4-4-2 defensive block with aggressive pressing triggers, preventing Germany from establishing the fluid central combinations that normally characterise their possession game.

The numbers illustrate the scale of that dominance out of possession. 

Paraguay registered 59 forced turnovers, 91 possession regains, 59 tackles, 52 blocks and 10 interceptions, outperforming Germany across every major defensive metric despite facing sustained territorial pressure.

Paraguay's Defensive Performance VS Germany - FIFA World Cup 2026 - Round Of 32

Rather than sitting permanently in a low block, Paraguay alternated between mid-block pressure and aggressive jumps towards the ball, recording 410 total pressures and 176 pressing actions into pressure, repeatedly forcing Germany away from central progression and towards less dangerous wide areas.

Germany generated large volumes of possession and circulation; many of their attacks were slowed before reaching the penalty area, allowing Paraguay's defensive unit to recover its shape and crowd the decisive spaces.

Several individuals embodied this collective defensive identity. 

Andrés Cubas produced perhaps the outstanding midfield display, contributing 11 tackles, 14 possession regains and seven blocks, while continuously screening passing lanes into Germany's attacking midfielders.

Junior Alonso added seven tackles, eight recoveries and constant defensive pressure from the back line, whereas Juan José Cáceres delivered an exceptional all-round defensive performance with five tackles, seven blocks, and nine possession regains.

Paraguay demonstrated that elite defensive organisation is no longer synonymous with passive football.

Their defensive numbers reflected an active strategy built around winning duels, anticipating passes and recovering possession quickly, turning defensive resilience into the platform for one of the World Cup's biggest upsets.

Pressing With Purpose, Not Just Intensity

High pressing has become one of the defining tactical characteristics of the tournament's most competitive underdogs, but the data suggests that success depends not simply on the volume of pressure applied, but on where and how it is executed.

FIFA World Cup 2026 Pressing Intensity: Defensive Pressures Vs Direct Defensive Pressures

Senegal took the lead in the first half and made it a two-goal lead just after half-time, all the while appearing in complete control.

However, Belgium completely flipped the match on its head, scoring two goals in the final five minutes of regular time.

At the death, they won a penalty that Youri Tielemans fired home to send them to the Round of 16, setting up a massive match with the United States.

It was a less-than-stellar group stage for Belgium with draws against both Iran and Egypt, but they seemingly found the tactics that made them so good during World Cup qualifying.

In this World Cup tactical analysis, we examine the tactics that gave Senegal a 2-0 lead and the changes Belgium made to flip the match and advance to the Round of 16.

Belgium Vs Senegal Lineups & Formations

Belgium Lineup Vs Senegal

Rudi Garcia lined his team up in a 4-2-3-1 formation.

Thibaut Courtois started in the net behind the centre-back pairing of Brandon Mechele and Arthur Theate.

Maxim De Cuyper started at left back, while Timothy Castagne started at right back.

Hans Vanaken and Youri Tielemans started together as the two central midfielders.

Jérémy Doku returned to the starting XI, starting on the left wing; Kevin De Bruyne started as the ‘10’, while Leandro Trossard started at right wing.

Charles De Ketelaere started in his usual place up top as the striker.

Rudi Garcia made six substitutions in the match.

In the 46th minute, Romelu Lukaku came on for De Ketelaere.

In the 56th minute, Dodi Lukébakio came on for Doku, and Nicolas Raskin came on for De Bruyne.

In the 63rd minute, Diego Moreira came on for Vanaken.

In the 78th minute, Thomas Meunier came on for De Cuyper

The final substitution came in the 109th minute when Amadou Onana came on for Trossard.

Senegal Lineup Vs Belgium

Pape Thiaw lined his team up in a 4-3-3 formation.

Mory Diaw started in the net behind the centre-back pairing of Moussa Niakhaté and Pathé Ciss.

Ismail Jakobs started at left back, while Krépin Diatta started at right back.

Pape Gueye, Idrissa Gana Gueye, and Habib Diarra started as the three midfielders.

Sadio Mané started at left wing, Ismaïla Sarr started at striker, while Iliman Ndiaye started at right wing.

Pape Thiaw made six substitutions in the match.

In the 66th minute, Lamine Camara came on for Pape Gueye.

In the 73rd minute, Pape Sarr came on for Diarra, and Ibrahim Mbaye came on for Ndiaye.

In the 93rd minute, Nicolas Jackson came on for Mané, and Malick Diouf came on for Jakobs.

The final substitution came in the 95th minute when Bara Ndiaye came on for Idrissa Gana Gueye.

Senegal’s Early Dominance

Senegal were very aggressive early on in the match and really took advantage of the lack of ball pressure by Belgium.

Belgium were sitting in a passive 4-1-4-1 low block when Senegal had the ball, but never really pressured their build-up play.

Senegal had a big chance early by using the space Belgium were giving them to have an easy pass out wide.

From here, a couple of quick passes opened up space behind to put a dangerous cross into the box that Sarr almost put in the back of the net.

Here is another example where Belgium's lack of intensity and ball pressure allows Senegal to make a couple of easy passes to set up a free cross into the box.

Senegal kept getting overloads, 2v2s, or 3v3s in the wide areas to set up crosses into the box, which is how they scored their opening goal.

Here, they have a 3v3.

Jakobs makes a run into the half-space, which gives Mane a little bit of space to whip in a cross to the box.

The ball finds Sarr, who wins the header that hits the post, but Diarra fires home the rebound into the back of the net.

At the end of the first half, Belgium had not even attempted a shot from inside the box.

Senegal finished the half creating 1.83 xG compared to only 0.16 for Belgium.

Right out of the halftime break, Senegal took advantage of Belgium's lack of ball pressure with a ball over the top to Sarr, who brought it down with great control and emphatically put it in the back of the net.

DR Congo were able to score the first goal, but were ultimately unable to protect their lead despite having created the chances to add a second goal.

Overall, this was a positive participation from Sébastien Desabre’s side, who achieved the best World Cup result in their history by reaching the Round of 32, as this was the first time they qualified for the knockout phase.

With a draw against Portugal, a win against Uzbekistan, and a loss against Colombia, DR Congo succeeded in passing the group stage among the best third-placed teams for the first time.

On the other side, Thomas Tuchel’s men qualified for the knockout phase by topping Group L after having beaten Croatia and Panama, while drawing to Ghana.

England’s performances have indeed been good enough so far, but there are some aspects that need to be improved ahead of the next rounds.

That’s why this World Cup tactical analysis article focuses mainly on how DR Congo were able to disturb England’s defensive organisation, score a goal and get close to adding a second.

The analysis also sheds light on England’s defensive errors and weaknesses that led to them conceding such chances.

England Vs DR Congo Lineups & Formations

England Lineup Vs DR Congo

Tuchel preferred to start the match using a 4-2-3-1 formation with Jordan Pickford as a goalkeeper, and a backline made up of Ezri Konsa and Marc Guéhi as centre-backs, Djed Spence as a right-back, and Nico O'Reilly as a left-back.

The midfield was formed of Elliot Anderson and Declan Rice as central midfielders, Jude Bellingham as the advanced playmaker, Marcus Rashford and Noni Madueke as wingers, with Harry Kane as the main striker.

DR Congo Lineup Vs England

On the other hand, Desabre used a 4-3-3 formation with Lionel Mpasi in goal, and a defensive line composed of Chancel Mbemba and Axel Tuanzebe as centre-backs, Aaron Wan-Bissaka as a right-back, and Arthur Masuaku as a left-back.

The midfield was made up of Samuel Moutoussamy, Ngal'ayel Mukau, and Noah Sadiki, while the attacking trio featured Brian Cipenga and Nathanaël Mbuku as wingers, with Yoane Wissa as the main striker.

DR Congo Intensity & Diamond Passing/Positioning On The Flanks

DR Congo were outstanding in the way they started the match as they showed no fear whatsoever against a strong team.

On the contrary, DR Congo’s start to the match was exemplary since they were solid enough in defence through compact defending in the middle while conceding some space in wide areas.

Despite that, they were able to limit England’s wingers from cutting inside or penetrating through the box when in possession of the ball out wide.

At the same time, DR Congo succeeded in being dangerous on the ball and showed a lot of personality and clear ideas in possession.

Instead of retreating and playing a defensive game, DR Congo preferred to start with attacking and having as much possession as possible, with the aim being to advance quickly through quick passing towards the wings and not just have horizontal/passive possession.

Choosing to play attacking football was a gamble that paid off for DR Congo simply because retreating and defending in their zone while clearing the ball away when possible and remaining in their own half for the whole match would have led to a catastrophic result against a team like England.

Creating issues for England in their own final third and showing them that they score at any time was rewarding for DR Congo, as it forced England to defend and retreat on more than one occasion instead of just trying to score.

DR Congo relied mainly on a diamond passing style in midfield and especially on the wings, with consistent movements without the ball to escape from marking and provide passing solutions to the ball holder.

These first-touch quick passes were recurrent and helped DR Congo get away from England’s intensity and double marking in midfield.

In addition to that, these quick passes were often concluded by a through pass in space to one of the two wingers, exploiting England’s intensity in midfield and lack of coverage in wide areas.

This example highlights this diamond passing style that was adopted by DR Congo on more than one occasion to beat England’s midfielders and defenders.

DR Congo’s ball possession, which was consistent inside England’s half, created some defensive confusion among the English and allowed DR Congo to believe even further in their ability to break that defensive line by continuing to use their quick passing, off-the-ball movement, and dribbling abilities of their wingers.

The goal action was born mainly thanks to Mbemba’s cross, which was oriented towards Sadiki’s penetration.

During this crossing attempt, Spence had to mark Sadiki and prevent him from running towards the goal without marking, since both Guéhi and Konsa did not notice this penetration on time and were busy marking Wan-Bissaka and Wissa.

This led to a perfect situation for Cipenga, who followed the cross and found himself completely unmarked with the ball inside the box; the perfect scenario for a winger.

What made this action possible was also the underestimation of Cipenga’s talent and DR Congo’s potential wide threats in general, as that was obvious in Madueke’s reluctant retreat to support Spence.

The same applies to Anderson, who could have read the situation better and leaned towards Cipenga to prevent him from shooting.

Overall, this numerical superiority situation that was created on the left wing was caused by England’s lack of discipline in supporting defenders, as well as the lack of understanding and communication between the defenders regarding individual marking.

Spence could have simply asked Konsa to mark Sadiki in this action and let Spence mark Cipenga to avoid falling in DR Congo’s trap.

Although the Round of 32 is still ongoing at the time of writing, we already have a good idea of which nations could have favourable fixtures heading into the next round.

That also allows Fantasy World Cup managers to begin preparing their squads before the World Cup Matchday 5 deadline on 18:00 BST on Saturday July 4 2026.

This FIFA Fantasy World Cup Round of 16 guide aims to help you do exactly that as we discuss some of the best players to target ahead of the MD5 deadline.

This Fantasy Football analysis also takes a look at several differential options who could benefit from the Scouting Bonus before finally highlighting a few other players who may be worth considering.

FIFA World Cup Fantasy Round Of 16 Fixtures

Canada face Morocco.

Paraguay face France.

Brazil face Norway.

Mexico face England.

Portugal face Spain.

The USMNT face Belgium.

Two Round of 16 fixtures are still to be confirmed.

Why Fantasy World Cup Round Of 16 Is Different

The knockout stages always bring a slightly different approach to World Cup Fantasy.

Rather than simply targeting players with the easiest fixtures, fantasy managers also need to think about which teams are capable of progressing deep into the tournament.

The dynamics also change slightly, with managers now able to own four players from the same nation instead of three.

It is also worth remembering that the Scouting Bonus remains available.

Any player with under five per cent ownership who scores four or more fantasy points during a matchday will receive an additional two points, making differentials even more valuable during the knockout stages.

France Continues To Be The Team To Target

France have looked like one of the strongest teams at this World Cup.

After beating Sweden 3-0 in the Round of 32, they now face Paraguay in what looks to be one of the more favourable Round of 16 fixtures.

That naturally makes several French players difficult to ignore from a fantasy perspective.

Kylian Mbappé remains the standout option.

The French forward has already scored six goals at the tournament and continues to be the focal point of Didier Deschamps' attack.

With the Golden Boot also being a realistic target, many fantasy managers will once again be expecting attacking returns.

Meanwhile, Michael Olise has quietly become one of the best fantasy assets at the tournament.

The winger currently leads the World Cup with five assists, is expected to start, and also takes set-pieces.

For managers looking for differentials, Bradley Barcola and Désiré Doué are both currently below five per cent ownership.

While there is some uncertainty over which of the two will start on the left wing, both remain eligible for the Scouting Bonus and offer significant upside.

France's defence is also worth considering.

With clean-sheet odds of 60 per cent, Dayot Upamecano and Jules Koundé appear to be the safest defensive options after starting every match so far.

Morocco Is Still Impressing Fantasy WC Managers

Morocco have become one of the surprise packages of the tournament.

Following impressive performances during the group stage and a penalty shootout victory over the Netherlands in the Round of 32, they now face Canada with a place in the quarter-finals at stake.

That has made several Morocco players increasingly attractive fantasy options.

Achraf Hakimi continues to justify his reputation as one of the best attacking defenders in the game.

Although certain metrics show that Morocco already have a 41% chance of keeping a clean sheet against Canada, Hakimi's appeal extends beyond defensive points after already producing one goal and one assist at the tournament.

Further forward, Ismael Saibari continues to attract attention.

Despite being listed as a midfielder, Saibari has often operated as Morocco's central striker and has already scored three goals during the tournament.

Brahim Díaz also remains an interesting option.

The midfielder costs just $6.4m, is likely to be Morocco's first-choice penalty taker and still qualifies for the Scouting Bonus with only three per cent ownership.

Lionel Messi Vs Kylian Mbappé

Lionel Messi and Kylian Mbappé have once again become two of the biggest talking points ahead of the next fantasy deadline.

Mbappé already has six goals and continues to lead France's attack heading into their Round of 16 meeting with Paraguay.

Messi, meanwhile, also has six goals before Argentina's Round of 32 match against Cape Verde.

Should Argentina progress as expected, they would face either Australia or Egypt in the Round of 16, which could prove to be one of the more favourable routes into the quarter-finals.

Both players have become essential fantasy assets at this stage of the tournament, and managers who do not currently own either of them may find them to be their highest priorities ahead of MD5.

England Continue To Offer Fantasy Value

England face one of the more difficult Round of 16 fixtures against Mexico.

However, Thomas Tuchel's side still possess several interesting fantasy options.

Harry Kane remains England's standout attacking asset after taking his tally to five goals with a brace against DR Congo.

Jude Bellingham has also continued to impress, contributing two goals and one assist so far.

One important factor during the knockout stages is player security.

Should the match require extra time, both Kane and Bellingham appear likely to remain on the pitch throughout, increasing their opportunities to collect fantasy points.

Defensively, Ezri Konsa and Nico O'Reilly are both owned by fewer than 12 per cent of managers and could appeal to those looking for differentials at the back.

Best Differential Picks For The Round Of 16

The Scouting Bonus once again creates opportunities for managers willing to move away from the more popular names.

Lucas Digne offers an affordable route into France's defence after starting the last two matches.

France have already kept two clean sheets at the tournament, and Digne remains below five per cent ownership.

Djed Spence could also become an interesting option for England.

With England short of options at full-back, Spence may now establish himself as the preferred right-back for the remainder of the tournament.

Noussair Mazraoui also returns to consideration after missing Matchday 3.

The Morocco defender continues to make attacking runs from full-back and now faces a Canada side that has struggled to score throughout the tournament.

In midfield, Elliot Anderson has already shown that fantasy points can come from several different areas.

His 14 points have been built through clean sheets, tackles and attacking contributions rather than goals alone.

Alexis Mac Allister has accumulated the same total and continues to offer consistent returns for Argentina.

Further forward, Roberto Alvarado has quietly become one of Mexico's most creative players.

The winger has already provided three assists while creating 10 chances and four big chances at the World Cup.

Breel Embolo is another forward worth considering.

Other Players Worth Considering

Defenders

Jorge Sánchez - México

Maxim De Cuyper - Belgium

Antonee Robinson - United States

Midfielders

Entering the competition with high expectations and carrying the hopes of an entire nation, the Pharaohs have worked hard to put themselves in a strong position ahead of the knockout stage.

This campaign has also produced several historic milestones.

Egypt secured their first-ever FIFA World Cup victory with a 3-1 win over New Zealand.

Before that, they opened the tournament with a 1-1 draw against Belgium, before earning another 1-1 draw against Iran.

Those results were enough to see Egypt qualify as runners-up in their group with five points.

Beyond the results, Egypt’s performances have shown a side that has grown in confidence as the tournament has progressed.

Although there are still areas to improve, both in and out of possession, the overall trajectory has been highly encouraging.

With the knockout rounds approaching, the challenge now becomes even greater.

Some tactical details, individual quality, and the ability to manage decisive moments will likely determine how far Egypt can progress.

This World Cup tactical analysis examines the Egyptian National Team’s structure in and out of possession, highlighting the key strengths that have carried them to this stage of the tournament, while also identifying the areas that still require improvement.

Egypt Starting XI & Formation

Hossam Hassan sets Egypt up in a 4-4-2 formation.

Mostafa Shobeir typically starts in goal behind the centre-back pairing of Yasser Ibrahim at right centre-back and Hamdy Fathy at left centre-back. 

Ahmed Fatouh starts at left-back, while Mohamed Hany starts at right-back.

Marwan Attia and Mohanad Lasheen start together as the two central midfielders, with Emam Ashour on the left wing, Mohamed Salah as the ‘10’ and Mostafa Ziko on the right wing.

Omar Marmoush takes his usual place up top as the striker. 

There are a few changes that could be made to this lineup.

Ramy Rabia could replace either of the centre-backs, while Zizo and Trézéguet are the most likely options to come on in the wide areas.

Up front, we could also see FC Barcelona Atlètic's new centre-forward, Hamza Abdelkarim, get some game time.

Egypt Style Of Play

Egypt Defensive Corners

Having conceded three goals during the tournament so far, including one from a corner against New Zealand and one against Iran, while also surviving a disallowed free-kick goal against Iran, it is worth beginning with Egypt’s defensive set-piece structure.

When they conceded to New Zealand, Egypt defended with three zonal markers (red), four man-markers (blue), one player on the edge of the box, and two defenders ready to deal with a short corner from the start.

New Zealand attacked with five players positioned deep near the goal line to draw both the man-markers and zonal defenders towards goal, leaving the area around the edge of the six-yard box free.

Their target player started at the far post before separating from his marker and attacking the near-post zone from the blind side of Egypt’s zonal defenders, helped by one of his teammates blocking Egypt's goalkeeper.

This positive dynamic has carried over into the Round of 32.

Javier Aguirre's team gave a football masterclass against Ecuador, advancing to the Round of 16 and shedding the mere "host" label to rightfully claim that of a true protagonist in this World Cup.

The 2-0 victory, while featuring a solid defensive closure by the Mexicans, boasted one of the most stimulating, entertaining, and refreshing first-half performances of the entire World Cup.

Driven by positive flank dynamics through offensive off-the-ball movement, the Mexican team successfully disorganised Ecuador's backline during advanced build-up phases and found free men in the initial phases of construction, enjoying fluidity in possession and a clean progression.

The key?

A crucial adjustment by the experienced manager ahead of this match: the inclusion of wonderkid Gilberto Mora and winger Roberto Alvarado's inverted movements from the flank into interior zones.

In this World Cup tactical analysis, we will attempt to break down the key movement within the progression of Aguirre's side.

Mexico Vs Ecuador Lineups & Formations

Mexico Lineup Vs Ecuador

Mexico used a 4-4-1-1 formation in this game, with Raúl Rangel playing in goal behind Jorge Sánchez at right-back, César Montes at right centre-back, Johan Vásquez at left centre-back, and Jesús Gallardo at left-back.

Érik Lira and Luis Romo played in central midfield, with Roberto Alvarado and Julián Quiñones on the right and left wing, respectively.

Gilberto Mora played in the hole just behind centre-forward Raúl Jiménez.

Javier Aguirre made five substitutions in the match, the first of which came in the 58th minute when Gilberto Mora was replaced by Brian Gutiérrez.

Then, 15 minutes later, Luis Romo and Raúl Jiménez made way for Obed Vargas and Santiago Giménez.

Lastly, in the 80th minute, Julián Quiñones and Roberto Alvarado left the pitch, with Orbelín Pineda and Israel Reyes coming on in their place.

Ecuador Lineup Vs Mexico

As for Ecuador, Sebastián Beccacece set his side up in a 4-4-2 shape with Hernán Galíndez in goal behind a back four consisting of Alan Franco, Joel Ordóñez, Willian Pacho, and Piero Hincapié, from right to left.

Pedro Vite and Moisés Caicedo played in central midfield, with John Yeboah and Nilson Angulo at the right and left wing, respectively.

Gonzalo Plata and Enner Valencia played up front for the South American side, who went on to make five substitutions during the match.

Firstly, Joel Ordóñez and Alan Franco made way for Ángelo Preciado and Yaimar Medina at half-time.

Then, around the hour mark, Kevin Rodríguez was introduced for Enner Valencia.

Ecuador's final two substitutions came in the 79th minute when Jordy Caicedo and Kendry Páez came on for John Yeboah and Nilson Angulo.

Mexico Build-Up Play

We cannot discuss Mexico's build-up play without highlighting Gilberto Mora's inclusion in the starting XI.

The national team manager's trust in the young footballer was no coincidence.

During the group stage, Mora delivered an outstanding performance against Czechia, a display that ultimately convinced the coaching staff to grant him a starting spot in the knockout clash against Ecuador.

At 17 years and 259 days old, he became the second-youngest player to start a World Cup knockout match, a list still topped by Pelé.

And the kid delivered under pressure.

He forced Aguirre to rethink the structure, adapting it to Mora's natural attacking midfielder profile, with Mexico shaping up in a 4-4-1-1 where Mora floated behind the centre-forward, leaning toward the inside-right channel.

This created an ideal environment to strengthen relationships and connections, establishing the right side of the attack and build-up as Mexico's strong side.

This zone featured highly associative players such as Mora himself, Alvarado, Jorge Sánchez pushing up from full-back, and the supporting movements toward the strong side by the double pivot formed by Luis Romo and Érik Lira.

What Was Mexico's Key Tactical Move Vs Ecuador?

In one of the most brilliant tactical adjustments of the World Cup, these right-flank build-up dynamics were amplified by the behaviour of Alvarado, nominally the right winger.

The mission of the game plan?

To deactivate, or draw into the wrong zones, the opponent's best defender, Piero Hincapié, is a proven asset in open-field duels or when anticipating early in the build-up phase.

To avoid finding Alvarado in uncomfortable scenarios, such as receiving with his back to goal or in 1v1 situations against Hincapié, the winger tended to move into interior zones through supporting runs or by dropping deep.

Ecuador, deploying a mirrored structure at the back to neutralise Mexico's 4+2 build-up via their own 4-4-2 and individual man-marking, failed to detect Alvarado's movement, which forced Hincapié to either step up or press far from his original position.

This triggered two potential reactions: Hincapié would track Alvarado as he dropped deep into the pitch, leaving space behind him and forcing the centre-back to cover, or he would remain cautious, giving Alvarado the time and space to receive, open his body up, and carry or progress the ball.

Thus, Mexico began building numerical and positional superiority right from their initial build-up phases.

Unleashing Gilberto Mora

The reason we highlight young Mora is that his natural profile as an attacking midfielder triggered a massive upgrade in the tempo of Mexico's attacks.

His brilliant technique is matched by an outstanding football IQ for his age, possessing the mental and cognitive capacity to dominate spaces between the lines, detect deep areas to exploit, and connect smoothly with nearby teammates (known as socio-affective superiority).

Even though Mexico build and attack within a positional model, prioritising the rational occupation of space, Aguirre gave his star boy the freedom to threaten wherever his intuition took him.

This, combined with Alvarado moving into interior channels, generated a sort of double playmaker setup within the initial 4-4-2.

The chemistry between both players allowed the hosts to further exploit the space behind Hincapié through a combination of supporting runs (Alvarado) and runs in behind (Mora).

As many sides attempt to force the opposition out wide when defending, any team will face the challenge of finding a way to either break through on the wing or to play back into the centre when possessing the ball on either flank.

Wing-play allows several concepts and strategies to break the opposition defence and create goal-scoring opportunities.

Underlap and overlap runs are common and effective concepts when attacking through wide areas.

While the overlapping run is way more popular, underlapping runs hold some advantages that the overlap does not provide.

In our tactical analysis, we examine the anatomy of these runs and explain their effects on teammates and opposition players in detail.

This will allow you to understand all the pros and cons of overlap and underlap.

What Are Overlapping & Underlapping Runs?

To begin with, we have to define the meaning of overlapping or underlapping runs.

In general, either of the two strategies can be described as a player's forward run from a more defensive position past the ball-carrier into the space behind the opposition defence.

Overlapping and underlapping runs are amongst the most vertical group tactical concepts during the attacking phase.

They are closely connected with the progression up the pitch and final third actions.

As a result, they are also connected with chance creation.

Nevertheless, as these runs require space (since the over- or underlapping player needs a free lane for his run) and time (because the over- or underlapping player has to run past the ball carrier), they are rather executed in wide areas than in the crowded centre of the pitch.

The difference between the overlap and the underlap lies in the path of the run in relation to the ball-carrier.

An overlapping player commits his run on the outside of the ball-carrier and thereby in a wide area.

An underlapping player commits the run on the inside of the ball-carrier and therewith in a more central area.

The overall goal of overlaps and underlaps is to achieve one of two things.

Either the runs enable getting behind the opposition's defence, or they open up space in central areas to play into the half-space or the central channel.

From there, the team has more attacking options than on the wing, where the passing options are naturally restricted through the touchline.

The group tactical aim behind overlaps and underlaps is to create a numerical advantage.

Overlapping and underlapping runs are simple yet effective tools for creating numerical advantages and overloading the opposition full-back.

In addition to that, they offer dynamism and, therefore, require quick defensive reactions from the opposition.

Dynamic actions decrease the time for the opposition's reaction and make the defenders' decision about their next defensive move more complex.

Also, through the deep run, the space behind the opposition defence can be threatened, which often forces the opposition backwards, allowing the progression up the pitch.

On an individual level, both the overlap and the underlap affect the positioning and movement of the opposition defender.

Therefore, the run can solely serve as a manipulation instrument, enabling the ball carrier to outplay the defender on the other side.

However, if the opposition defender does not adjust his positioning, the runner becomes a valuable option to overplay the defender.

When To Overlap Or Underlap?

As we have already defined the overlap and the underlap, we will provide you with a question.

What would you do in the displayed scenario as the full-back of the red team: overlap or underlap?

In the following paragraphs, we will discuss several aspects of overlapping and underlapping runs to give you starting points on which to build your decision.

Strategies Facilitating Overlapping And Underlapping Runs

Overlaps and underlaps are often seen when sides deploy systems with two wide players on each side.

This is because these systems already provide the required personnel out wide.

The most common scenario is a team playing with wingers receiving the ball out wide.

Then, the full-back would move up to overlap or underlap.

But sides that play with wing-backs as the only wide players and a rather centrally focused attacking approach can also move an additional player out wide once the ball is on the wing to create an overlap or underlap.

To sum up, overlaps and underlaps are independent of the system.

The system, however, can affect how these runs are executed.

Most of the time, full-backs commit overlapping runs due to their positioning on the pitch.

But it does not necessarily have to be a full-back who overlaps.

Sheffield United and Atalanta, for instance, used overlapping centre-backs.

And central midfielders can obviously also move to the wing to overlap, although this happens less often.

As underlapping runs are committed in a more central area, often either central midfielders or full-backs will make them.

The latter will most often underlap if they stay in the half-space to cover the attack right before the team switches sides or if they play as inverted full-backs.

The runs are extremely threatening in connection with the concept of “overloading to isolate”.

When overloading one side before switching play to the other side, where they isolate the winger against the opposition full-back, an over- or underlapping run can create a 2v1 situation with a lot of space.

If executed well, the opposition full-back can then be outplayed.

In addition, overlapping and underlapping runs have proven especially useful in combination with the use of inverted wingers.

That is because it facilitates cutting inside when playing with a right-footed left winger or vice versa.

Therefore, the aim of getting into a central area can be achieved.

Advantages And Disadvantages Of Overlap Runs

As for any tactical concept, the overlap comes with advantages and disadvantages.

One of the most obvious advantages is that the overlapping player has a good pre-orientation, as all goal-near players are within his field of view.

That can be helpful if teams intend to put in crosses with their overlapping players.

That way, they can already get a clear picture of the available crossing options, leading to improved decision-making as the time for perception is increased.

Another advantage is that there is more room in the half-space, as the overlapping player does not block any passing lanes within or into the half-space.

That makes connecting to the wide players easier for the central midfielders.

However, executing an overlapping run also means the runner attracts an opposition wide player in most scenarios.

As a result, the opposition central midfielders can keep their position and shut down the passing lanes into the centre.

A further negative aspect of the overlap is that the overlapping player is not within the field of view of the ball-carrier while being on full display for the opposition defender.

This facilitates defending and simultaneously complicates finding the right timing for a possible pass.

Advantages And Disadvantages Of Underlap Runs

The pros and cons of the underlap are a bit more complex.

That is because it is executed within the own attacking shape and the defending shape of the opposition.

Instead of running "around" like in the case of the overlap, underlapping players will run through the formations, creating more complex interactions with teammates and opposition players.

Compared to the overlap, the underlapping player is closer to the goal (often in the half-space) and, therefore, takes up a more threatening position.

Consequently, it is more urgent for the opposition to defend the underlapping player.

This increases the probability of successfully taking an opponent out of play.

Moreover, in contrast to the overlap, which mainly affects the opposition wide players, an underlapping run drags an opposition central player out of position.

This possibly opens up a passing lane into the half-space, centre, or space to dribble or pass into, as shown below.

Also, as displayed below, playing the ball to the underlapping player will result in a diagonal pass.

Diagonal passes hold several advantages in football.

In this particular case, it requires the opposition to defend in another channel (the half-space), which occupies not only the wide players but also their centre-backs and central midfielders.

A strong advantage of the underlap compared to the overlap is that the underlapping run is out of the defenders’ field of view.

As a consequence, the defender can only guess the runner's current positioning, making it nearly impossible to always cut off the passing lane.

Also, it enables the ball-carrier to feint passes due to the disadvantage of the defender not knowing where the underlapping player is currently positioned.

At the same time, the ball carrier can always see the position of the underlapping player, enabling him to play a pass with good timing.

Field of view is also advantageous when dragging an opposition defender out of the position with an underlapping run.

The direct opponent of the ball-carrier confides in his teammate, supporting him.

With an underlap, one can drag this teammate out of position without the defender recognising it.

Consequently, the direct opponent does not change his body shape, and an initial ideal positioning can quickly become disadvantageous.

This then enables the ball carrier to exploit the body shape and positioning to dribble into the created space.

But as for any concept, there will also be disadvantages when there are advantages.

One of those is that the underlapping player intermediately blocks the path into the centre.

This can be seen in the image below.

Even if a central midfielder is free, the runner will cross the passing lane, which poses the risk that the ball collides with the underlapping player if a pass should be played into the centre.

Another negative side effect of the underlap-path is that the underlapping player has a worse pre-orientation when receiving.

He can't possibly focus on both the ball and the situation within the box simultaneously.

However, players with good awareness might be able to compensate for this.

Furthermore, the runner will be in the cover-shadow of the defender.

Nevertheless, since the underlap is a dynamic action, the period of time within the cover-shadow is comparably short.

While the overlap is also useful in tight spaces and when the opposition could outnumber the ball carrier, the underlap is more sensible in situations with available space for the ball carrier in 1v1 situations.

The reason for that is the described intermediate restrictions the underlap has on the attacking options, with the underlapping player blocking passing lanes and being in the cover shadow.

If the ball carrier is under pressure and needs an immediate option, the underlap is not as helpful as the overlap.

Decision-Making: Overlap Or underlap?

After having examined the advantages and disadvantages of the overlap and the underlap in detail, we can return to the initial question of our tactical theory piece.

Whether it is better to overlap or to underlap in the displayed scenario depends on several factors that are unknown to us:

• Is the ball-carrier left-footed or right-footed?
• Is the ball-carrier comfortable on the ball?
• Does the ball-carrier usually prefer to stay on the outside or to cut inside?
• Where exactly is the opposition winger (not in the image yet)?
• Does the attacking team prefer crosses or through passes?

The decision on when to overlap and when to underlap is too complex to provide a wholesale answer.

As we mentioned in the course of our analysis, overlaps and underlaps are dynamic actions.

They cannot be depicted in a still image.

The given scenario still explains why either an overlapping or an underlapping run is useful.

With an overlap, the opposition full-back would be overloaded and needed to drop closer to the goal.

With the right timing, one could get behind the defence on the flank.

Depending on the opposition, there would probably also be the opportunity for the ball-carrier to cut inside.

With an underlap, on the other hand, there would occur moments when the ball carrier is isolated in a 1v1 instead of a possible 2v1, as the underlapping player would be in the defender's cover shadow or block the passing lane into the centre.

But the underlapping player would probably drag the opposition central midfielder out of his position, opening up space for a pass into the centre.

An underlap might increase the chance of penetrating the opposition defence in the half-space instead of on the flank.

Follow-Up Actions

They are highly connected to the above-mentioned advantages and disadvantages of overlapping and underlapping runs and offer several sensible follow-up actions.

At first, we take a closer look at the actions achieving the aim of getting behind the defence.

The simplest pattern would be a pass into the run of the overlapping player, who can then send in a cross.

This can be a sensible attacking option for teams that score from crosses.

Depending on the position, different crosses can threaten the opposition's goal.

The second option to get directly behind the opposition's backline is to pass to an underlapping player.

Due to the different position (closer to the goal), different ways of crossing compared to the overlap are sensible here.

From the half-space, cut-back crosses can be extremely dangerous as they do not travel as long as a high cross and allow for more precision when finishing the attack.

The second aim is to escape from the wing and return to the central channels, which offer a greater variety of attacking options.

In some situations, the ball carrier can pass into a central channel (followed by a switch of play or a penetrating through pass).

Especially, the underlap often opens up a passing lane into the centre because the runner attracts the central midfielder.

That creates space in a central channel, which can then be exploited.

The overlap will probably not drag the central midfielder out of position.

Instead, the opposition might shift heavily towards the wing, opening up space on the other side, which can be exploited after a switch of play.

Last but not least, a very popular scenario is that the ball carrier cuts inside with a dribble to either finish, play a through pass, or send in a cross into the space behind the defence.

This is useful when attacking with inverted wingers like Liverpool.

Their full-backs constantly overlap or underlap.

This manipulates the defenders' positioning, enabling their wingers to carry the ball inside.

Obviously, there are thousands of different follow-up actions.

Since this piece is not supposed to cover all the different types of crosses, we did not go into too much detail.

That has made Mikel Oyarzabal one of the most interesting players to analyse in Luis de la Fuente’s system.

This Mikel Oyarzabal scout report and player analysis looks at Mikel Oyarzabal's role during Spain’s three Group H matches against Cape Verde, Saudi Arabia and Uruguay.

Across those games, Oyarzabal moved between three different contexts.

Against Cape Verde, he was the isolated centre-forward in a slow and predictable attacking structure.

Against Saudi Arabia, he became Spain’s decisive player, registering two goals and one assist inside the opening 25 minutes.

Against Uruguay, he was less spectacular, but still useful as a reference point in a more physical and controlled match.

That contrast is exactly what makes this Mikel Oyarzabal analysis valuable.

He is not a traditional No. 9 who dominates through speed, height or repeated physical duels.

Instead, Oyarzabal’s style of play is based on timing, technical security, associative movement and intelligent occupation of the penalty area.

For Spain, he is not only a finisher.

He is a functional centre-forward who helps connect the final third, create space for wide players, and provide the first point of pressure out of possession.

Mikel Oyarzabal Style Of Play

Oyarzabal is a left-footed forward who has spent much of his career operating from wide areas or as a second striker, but Spain have increasingly used him as a central attacking reference.

That role suits some of his strongest qualities, although it also exposes certain limitations.

He is not a centre-forward who constantly pins centre-backs through power or threatens the space behind with elite pace; his game is more subtle.

Oyarzabal prefers to move across the front line, receive with his back to goal, combine with nearby midfielders and then arrive inside the box when the attack reaches its final stage.

This makes him particularly useful for a team like Spain.

De la Fuente’s side usually builds with control, uses positional rotations to move opponents and relies on wide players such as Lamine Yamal or Nico Williams to generate imbalance.

In that structure, the centre-forward does not only need to score.

He must keep the attack connected.

Oyarzabal’s best qualities are his timing and his understanding of when to stay high and when to drop.

When he remains on the last line, he can fix centre-backs and open pockets for Pedri, Dani Olmo or Álex Baena between the lines.

When he drops towards the ball, he can act as a wall pass and help Spain play around pressure.

His movements are rarely explosive, but they are usually well-timed.

He often waits until the defender has fixed their body shape before moving into the blind side or attacking the gap between centre-back and full-back.

This is especially useful when Spain circulates the ball wide and then crosses or cuts the ball back into central areas.

However, this profile also depends heavily on the structure around him.

If Spain move the ball too slowly or fail to create width and depth around him, Oyarzabal can become disconnected.

That was clear in the opening match against Cape Verde.

In this example, Spain circulates possession around Cape Verde’s compact block, but the central passing lane into Oyarzabal is closed.

The Real Sociedad forward remains positioned as the central reference, yet he is surrounded by defenders and cannot receive with an advantage.

This helps explain why Spain’s possession often became sterile: they reached advanced areas, but their ball circulation did not consistently create clean access into their centre-forward.

Against Cape Verde, Spain dominated the ball but did not dominate the most valuable spaces with enough clarity.

They had 65.7% possession, completed 755 of their 811 passes, produced 27 shots and generated 2.26 expected goals.

They also recorded 426 receptions in the final third and 39 crosses.

On paper, that looks like attacking control.

In reality, much of their possession became predictable.

Cape Verde defended deep and compact, forcing Spain to attack around the block rather than through it.

Oyarzabal suffered because of that.

He was positioned as the central reference, but he did not receive enough high-quality service in zones where he could combine or finish quickly.

Spain reached the final third repeatedly, but their attacks often lacked the tempo or disguise needed to give him separation from his markers.

This is an important distinction.

Oyarzabal’s quiet performance was not simply a question of poor individual involvement.

It was also a reflection of Spain’s attacking structure.

If the ball arrives slowly, and the opposition’s defensive line is already set, Oyarzabal does not have the physical profile to turn hopeful crosses into consistent chances by himself.

Mikel Oyarzabal In Possession

In possession, Oyarzabal’s role is built around three main behaviours: fixing the defensive line, connecting with the players around him and attacking the penalty area with timing.

As a centre-forward, he gives Spain a reference between the centre-backs.

This is important because Spain often use several players who want to receive between the lines.

Pedri, Olmo, Baena and Fabián Ruiz can all occupy interior spaces, while Yamal often starts wide before moving inside onto his stronger left foot.

If Oyarzabal constantly dropped away from the defensive line, Spain would risk overcrowding the midfield and losing depth.

Therefore, one of his main tasks is to maintain the last line.

This prevents the opposition centre-backs from stepping forward too aggressively and creates space for Spain’s attacking midfielders to receive in front of them.

Even when Oyarzabal does not touch the ball, his positioning can be useful because it stretches the opponent vertically.

However, he is not a static striker.

His best actions often come when he moves away from the centre-back at the right moment.

Against Saudi Arabia, that was much clearer than against Cape Verde.

Spain had more speed, more width and better connections around the box.

As a result, Oyarzabal could participate in the final action rather than simply waiting for service.

Saudi Arabia defended in a 5-4-1, but Spain found ways to move the block with quicker circulation and better occupation of wide areas.

They had 63.2% possession, produced 22 shots, generated 3.2 expected goals and completed 159 line breaks.

They also recorded 259 receptions in the final third and 28 crosses, showing a much more productive attacking structure.

Oyarzabal’s assist for Yamal after 10 minutes was a perfect example of his value as a connector.

This sequence shows Oyarzabal’s value beyond his penalty-box movement.

He first drops away from the defensive line to offer Spain a central passing option, helping connect the midfield with the attack.

After linking the play, he immediately attacks the space behind Saudi Arabia’s backline, receiving in the left channel with forward momentum.

From there, he recognises Yamal’s far-post run and delivers the ball across the box, turning his own movement away from goal into the assist for Spain’s opening goal.

Oyarzabal drops away from the front line to offer a passing option between Saudi Arabia’s midfield and defence.

This movement gives Spain a central connection and prevents him from becoming fixed between the centre-backs.

After receiving, Oyarzabal helps Spain progress through the centre before immediately preparing to attack the next space.

His movement shows the dual nature of his role: he can connect play and then become a runner.

Once Spain break the first line of pressure, Oyarzabal accelerates into the left channel.

His run targets the space behind the defensive line, giving Spain a forward option outside the central congestion.

Instead of forcing a shot from a wide angle, Oyarzabal recognises Yamal’s far-post run and delivers across the six-yard box.

The action underlines his value as a connector and creator, not only as a penalty-box finisher.

The pass is simple in appearance, but tactically significant.

Oyarzabal receives outside the most crowded central zone and turns that wide reception into a high-value chance.

By doing so, he improves Spain’s right-winger.

Yamal is often the player expected to create for others, but here Oyarzabal creates for him.

This is one of the reasons De la Fuente can trust him as a centre-forward.

Oyarzabal does not need every attacking move to finish with him.

He can also connect the attack, make the correct final-third decision and provide balance to a front line that contains more explosive profiles.

Mikel Oyarzabal Goalscoring Ability

Oyarzabal’s goal-scoring ability is less about volume and more about timing.

He is not a striker who constantly creates his own shots from nothing, but he is very effective when Spain create advantages around the box.

Against Saudi Arabia, he scored twice in three minutes and almost completed a first-half hat-trick.

His first goal came from a second phase after a corner.

Dani Olmo’s effort was flicked on by Aymeric Laporte, and Oyarzabal reacted quicker than Saud Abdulhamid before finishing into the bottom-right corner.

Clubs can either invest in someone to maximise their dead-ball performance or risk falling behind, losing out on double-digit points over a season.

As the role becomes more common across clubs, the obvious question is: what does a set-piece coach actually do, day to day?

Michael Mackin is one of the specialists answering that question in practice.

He started out doing remote work for teams, designing set-piece routines from the outside, also learning from Gianni Vio who was working at Tottenham Hotspur, one of the pioneers of set-piece specialisation as a standalone discipline.

Mackin picked up assignments, ideas, and teachings directly from Vio, who was responsible for Spurs' offensive set-pieces under Antonio Conte.

From there, he moved into a long spell at Burton Albion, working closely with John Brayford, who delivered the work on the pitch while Mackin focused on analysis and the attacking side.

They scored six set-piece goals in eight games during a tense run under Martin Paterson that helped keep the club up on the final day of the season.

The following years brought a string of managers: Mark Robinson, then an interim spell under Tom Hounsell, before Gary Bowyer arrived.

Since then, Mackin's career has taken him further with opposition analysis work with the Canada national team, a short spell with Derry City in Ireland, and close to a year now in the UAE, working across every youth age group, bar the U23S.

In the first of a two-part interview, Mackin breaks down the principles behind his work, how he builds a culture around set-pieces, the difference between coaching a club side and an international squad, and why, as he puts it, "context is everything."

TFA: How Did You First Become Interested In Set-Pieces?

Mackin traces it back to some of the biggest moments in football history.

"If you go back in history and look at some of the biggest games in the world, a fair few of them are decided by set-piece goals," he says.

One of his earliest memories is the 1998 FIFA World Cup Final, with Zinedine Zidane scoring twice from corners and Emmanuel Petit's goal coming from a set-piece transition.

He points to Manchester United scoring twice from corners in their 1998/1999 UEFA Champions League Final win, and Didier Drogba's Champions League Final goal for Chelsea, which also came from a corner.

"All these big moments happen from set-pieces, that was like the nostalgia part."

The interest became something more structured later, shaped by two influences.

The first was a book by Gianni Vio, written in Italian, that translates roughly as the '15-Goal Striker'.

The second was rugby, where he started out.

"Rugby was very set-piece driven; a line-out for me is very similar to a corner."

A line-out involves a call, often a sequence of numbers or a colour, telling the team exactly where the ball is going and who's involved.

"Little things like this are signals for players to remember."

"When I started to break down set-pieces from rugby, I realised there was a big, big connection."

He also points to Johnny Wilkinson, the rugby kicker who worked with a dedicated kicking coach rather than leaving his delivery to chance.

"He was leaving it to high-quality practice, and he was training it."

That idea, treating delivery as a trainable skill rather than as fixed talent, is one Mackin carried directly into his work in football.

TFA: What Are Your Set-Piece Principles & Beliefs?

For Michael Mackin, effective set-piece coaching begins before the players step onto the training pitch.

He believes creating a successful set-piece programme depends on building a culture around its importance.

That starts with complete support from the head coach and is reinforced by achieving early success, helping players develop confidence and buy into the process.

From a tactical perspective, Mackin places a strong emphasis on blocks, screens and the timing of attacking runs.

Rather than every player moving at the same time, he uses specific triggers, such as the taker's signal, the first movement of the kicker, or the moment the ball is struck, to coordinate different runs and create separation from defenders.

He also favours overloading key areas of the penalty box to create numerical advantages, while remaining flexible in how those overloads are constructed.

"I've used loads of different blocks, timings, screens, picks and overloads; I've used so many different routines and strategies."

TFA: What Defines How You Approach A Set-Piece? Do You Adapt To Your Players' Strengths Or The Opposition's Structure?

According to Mackin, the answer begins with context.

"Context is everything," he says, explaining that the time available to work with players shapes his approach.

A club coach may have a full six-week pre-season to develop delivery quality, consistency, and set-piece patterns.

International coaches often have only a few days to prepare.

One of the first priorities is ensuring that set-piece takers can consistently deliver the ball into dangerous areas with confidence.

The second priority lies in identifying player profiles.

Rather than simply selecting the tallest players, Mackin evaluates who is effective in aerial situations.

"Just because they're big doesn't mean they're the best headers of the ball," he says.

Smaller players, particularly wingers, can often attack the ball more aggressively and finish headers more consistently than physically imposing centre-backs or strikers.

Training helps identify which players repeatedly direct headers on target, allowing him to select attackers based on performance.

The same philosophy extends to defending set-pieces.

Instead of matching height with height, Mackin believes the role of a man-marker is often better suited to players with quick feet.

He points to N'Golo Kanté being assigned to mark Virgil van Dijk in a memorable image from the 2019 UEFA Super Cup Final.

Rather than competing physically, Kanté's role was to disrupt Van Dijk's movement long enough for the zonal defenders to attack the ball.

Mackin has found success using wingers as blockers because of their agility and ability to mirror changes of direction.

Ultimately, while the opposition's defensive structure is an important consideration, Mackin's philosophy is built around maximising his players' strengths.

TFA: Would You Say You Change Your Routines Based On The Opposition, Or Do You Prefer To Keep Them Consistent So Players Become Familiar With Their Roles?

Mackin believes there's a balance between consistency and adaptation.

He describes having a "fallback routine", a pattern players know instinctively and can execute regardless of the opposition.

Familiarity with the timing of runs and movements allows players to perform with confidence, even under pressure.

"Always have that generic routine," he explains.

Alongside core routines, Mackin develops opposition-specific 'special plays'.

He's built an extensive database of corner-kick routines, analysing more than 17,000 corners from leagues around the world, reviewing all goals and high-quality chances from 27 leagues each summer.

He points to Aston Villa as a recent example, by recognising that Liverpool consistently committed only two players to defend short corners regardless of the attacking structure, Villa were able to create numerical overloads.

He stresses, though, that even the best-designed routine must suit the players available.

"Context is everything," he repeats.

Not every team has a player capable of executing the kind of finish Youri Tielemans can produce from the edge of the box.

This technique involves overloading one side of the pitch to drag the majority of the opposition to that side, opening up space on the opposite side.

This tactical theory piece will explain why overloading to isolate is such a popular strategy in possession, and how teams employ specific tactics to execute it effectively.

The Importance Of Player Positioning In The Overload

The first key point to discuss in this technique is setting up the actual overload.

The objective of the players in possession on the overloaded side is to occupy as many opposition players as possible, dragging opponents over to create the maximum amount of space on the opposite side.

Therefore, we must discuss the most effective ways of doing so.

Let’s take a look at some scenarios.

In the above example, we, the Blue Team, are lined up in a 4-2-3-1 formation in possession.

The Red Team, the opposition, is also lined up in a 4-2-3-1 structure, which resembles a 4-4-1-1 formation out of possession, as shown.

The 4-2-3-1 formation is a common environment that allows the use of the concept of overloading to isolate, as it features a designated ‘number 10’.

The benefit of this player is that they are free to shift to either side of the pitch in possession, helping create an overload.

Here, we can see how the 10 simply shifting across can create a five-person overload on one side of the pitch.

This would be the opponent's most likely reaction, which involves the ball-near pivot shifting across to cover the number 10.

Whilst the opponent’s block has been forced to shift over, there isn’t a significant enough increase in space on the opposite flank for us to exploit.

To create more space on the opposite flank, our striker (number nine) can drift to the side of the pitch that we are overloading.

This forces the opposition’s defensive line to be pulled towards the ball-near flank.

We can now see how we can potentially start creating a 2v1 overload on the fullback on the far side, with our wide forward positioned narrow and our fullback staying high and wide.

To occupy as many opposition defenders as possible on the ball-near side, we must ensure that the spacing between our players in the overload is as efficient as possible.

In the graphic above, there are two clear examples of poor positioning.

Both our eight and 10 are positioned near each other.

This enables the opponent’s number 10 to mark both players simultaneously.

The same situation occurs with our numbers nine and 11 on the opposition left-back.

Since the full-back can mark both players, the defensive line can remain central.

If the number 11 moved wider, the full-back would be forced to follow, shifting the defensive line to one side of the pitch.

One further key aspect of this overload that we are creating is that we need our players to maintain possession of the ball, engaging the opposition and allowing time for them to be drawn to one side of the pitch.

To do so, we want each player in the overload to have as many passing options as possible.

We don’t want several players in the same horizontal or vertical line of the pitch to achieve this, as this will limit the number of passing lanes available to each player.

The above graphic exhibits an example of bad positioning.

Four players are lined up in a horizontal line.

As we can see here, numbers nine and 10 cannot be played to form number four as they are positioned directly behind number eight.

This makes it much easier for the opposition to block off passing lanes, thereby increasing their chances of intercepting a pass.

In contrast with the previous example, this is a good example of positioning that will enable the team in possession to keep the ball.

Here, there are no more than two players in the same horizontal or vertical line, maximising the number of passing options available to each player.

As a result, several triangles and diamonds have formed, an indicator that the positioning will allow for effective ball circulation.

If we take the same player, number four, as we did before, we can see that they now have access to potential passing lanes to all players in this area of the pitch.

This will be much harder for the opposition to close down.

The example above demonstrates Ajax Amsterdam creating an overload on one side of the pitch.

Ajax have essentially created a five-player rondo, and therefore, all have access to one another.

This allows them to keep the ball in this area of the pitch, drawing opposition defenders towards them.

Player Positioning In The Underloaded Zone

Now that we have discussed how we can best draw the opposition to one side to create space on the other, we must focus on how to exploit the space we have created on the side of the pitch that we have underloaded.

Again, the positioning of our players is vital.

It might be tempting to instruct the players to switch the ball directly from one flank to the other.

However, one direct pass that travels through the air can be slower than two or even three passes across the ground.

While a pass travels in the air, the opposition will have time to shift over and close down the space on the opposite side.

However, if we play the ball along the ground, it will travel more quickly, allowing us to take advantage of the space we have created.

In most circumstances, either two or three players will be involved on the underloaded side of the pitch.

The graphic above displays effective positioning with two players in advanced areas on the far side of the pitch.

Number six is positioned deeper in the inside channel and can therefore receive a pass in space as they are in front of the fullback.

This situation will ideally involve a pass from the inside channel of the overloaded side to the inside channel of the underloaded side.

Once the six has received the ball in space, they can play a pass through to the number seven, who will be isolated against the fullback if they are positioned high and wide, as shown above.

This is precisely where you want your players with the ability to beat defenders 1v1 to be: this is where the “isolate” part comes into play.

Usually, when a wide player receives the ball, not only will they have to deal with the fullback, but other defenders nearby can also support the fullback, creating a 1v2 situation against the wide forward.

However, the overloading to isolate method enables attackers to get into 1v1 situations since the rest of the defenders have been moved to one side.

As a result, the distance that needs to be covered to support the fullback is too great.

Here, the defensive midfielder receives the ball deep in the inside channel and can play a pass through to his winger.

The winger is now isolated 1v1 against the opposition's right-back.

He manages to beat him on the outside and drill the ball into the box, which is poked into the goal by a fellow attacker.

This graphic demonstrates effective positioning when three players are on the underloaded side.

One player, here, the number six, stays deep and relatively central.

The wide forward drifts narrow into the inside channel, freeing up the fullback on the overlap.

The isolation that takes place here is again against the opposition fullback, but this time, they are isolated 1v2, not just 1v1.

Therefore, with three players on the underloaded side, we can create a free man, as we will have a 2v1 against the opposition's fullback.

To achieve this scenario, the overload must be very effective in drawing the opposition over while still leaving three players for the team in possession to be positioned on the underloaded side.

We can use the techniques discussed earlier in this tactical analysis to draw the opposition to one side with as few players as possible.

In the above scenario, we see Ajax utilise this pattern of positioning.

Many coaches attribute the success of pressing to players' fitness or their courage to advance towards the opponent, while matches at the highest level reveal that pressing is not merely a reaction after losing possession but rather a collective behaviour planned before the ball reaches the opponent. 

The Morocco national team have provided a clear example of this concept at the 2026 FIFA World Cup. 

While they haven't dominated possession or relied on constant pressure, they've possessed a remarkable ability to choose the right moment to attack the ball carrier and force the opponent to play in the spaces they desired.

In this tactical theory and World Cup tactical analysis, we examine Mohamed Ouahbi pressing tactics at Morocco and detail how to coach a similar press.

Controlling Opponent Choices

One of the most common mistakes made by young coaches is believing that pressing begins when an attacker runs towards the centre of defence. 

In reality, pressing begins several seconds earlier when the team succeeds in limiting the opponent's options.

This was clearly evident in Morocco's draw with Brazil. 

When the Brazilian goalkeeper began building play, the Moroccan striker didn't rush directly towards him; instead, he moved at an angle that closed down the passing lane to the holding midfielder, while the wingers narrowed the space inside to prevent passes into the half-spaces. 

At the same time, the midfield pushed several meters forward, leaving the player in possession with only two options: pass to the wing or a long ball.

Here, Ismail Saibari is requesting the lines to advance to close down the pass vertically on the midfielders, forcing the build-up play to go to the wing.

Teams have sought to dominate the ball, dictate tempo, and gradually break down opponents through sustained periods of circulation.

The 2026 FIFA World Cup is increasingly challenging that assumption.

Across the opening stages of the tournament, matches have frequently been defined not by prolonged possession sequences but by what happens immediately after possession changes hands.

Rapid transitions, counterattacks, second-ball situations, and contested possession phases have become decisive features of games.

FIFA’s relatively new “in-contest possession” metric has further highlighted the growing importance of moments when neither team has full control of the ball, offering a more accurate picture of football’s chaotic and transitional nature.

In this World Cup data analysis, we examine how transition football has shaped the 2026 FIFA World Cup, exploring possession trends, direct attacking patterns, and the growing influence of reaction-based football on match outcomes.

The Round of 32 exits of Germany and the Netherlands add important context.

Both ranked among the tournament's most transitional sides.

Their eliminations reinforce the idea that strength in transitions alone doesn't guarantee progression, despite its stylistic prominence at the elite level.

Tactical efficiency, flexibility, game management, finishing and the fine margins of knockout football remain equally decisive.

Direct Circulation, Faster Attacks: Why Possession Is Becoming Increasingly Vertical

The 2026 FIFA World Cup is demonstrating that possession alone is no longer the primary measure of attacking intent.

Instead, many of the tournament’s leading nations are using possession as a platform to accelerate attacks rather than prolong them.

Passing Rate Per Minute Of Possession Among 2026 FIFA World Cup Nations

The Passes per Minute of Possession (PPM) metric highlights this shift, with the tournament average standing at 14.79 passes per minute. 

Among the leading contenders, almost every side exceeds that benchmark, Portugal leads the competition with 17.5, followed closely by Argentina (17.1), while both Spain and Germany record 17.0.

Brazil also remain comfortably above average at 15.9.

In contrast, France (15.1), the Netherlands (14.8) and England (14.8) all operate much closer to the tournament average, with 23 teams recording a faster passing rate while in possession.

Rather than suggesting a lack of attacking quality, these figures reflect a deliberate tactical preference.

Didier Deschamps, Ronald Koeman and Thomas Tuchel have generally favoured more measured circulation before attacking directly, valuing structural balance, defensive security and the quality of decisive actions over constant ball speed.

Their teams are less concerned with maximising passing frequency and more focused on identifying the right moment to attack vertically, often creating transition opportunities through patient positioning rather than relentless circulation.

The tactical profiles of the remaining contenders reinforce the broader statistical trend.

Roberto Martínez’s Portugal, Lionel Scaloni’s Argentina, Luis de la Fuente’s Spain and Julian Nagelsmann’s Germany all encourage rapid ball circulation designed to provoke defensive shifts before exploiting vertical passing lanes.

Likewise, Carlo Ancelotti’s Brazil have combined greater positional control with quicker progression than in previous tournaments. 

Collectively, the data suggests that the modern World Cup is moving away from possession for possession’s sake.

Instead, faster circulation has become a mechanism for creating transition-like situations within organised possession, blurring the traditional distinction between positional play and counterattacking football.

The ball is increasingly being moved with purpose rather than simply retained, reflecting a tournament in which verticality has become just as valuable as control.

Running To Transition: Physical Intensity Behind The World Cup’s Fastest Attacks

The tactical evolution of the 2026 FIFA World Cup has not only been reflected in how quickly teams move the ball, but also in how aggressively they attack space without it.

The tournament’s high-speed running data illustrates that transition football is driven as much by physical intensity as tactical organisation.

High-Speed Running Vs Sprints Per 90 - Group Stage - FIFA World Cup 2026

A high defensive line is a tactic that allows teams to press whilst keeping the distances between their lines tight, preventing them from being played through.

When done effectively, it can suffocate opposition teams, especially those with a possession-based playing style.

However, it is not without risk.

It is a tactic that requires a supremely disciplined defensive unit with the bravery and athleticism to implement it.

A player’s natural reaction when out of possession is often to drop back and protect their goal.

This tactic takes defenders out of their comfort zone.

This high-line tactical theory offers a tactical analysis of how to do a high line using Diego Martínez’s former Las Palmas as a model team.

When picturing a high line, the Netherlands’s aggressive offside trap at the 1974 World Cup may spring to mind.

More recently, an example could be Tottenham’s iconic nine-man display against Chelsea and the image of almost all their outfield players positioned on the halfway line.

This tactical theory piece, however, focuses on the defensive line being high relative to the ball, including when teams are on the edge of their own defensive third.

Also included in this tactical analysis are ideas on practices that coaches can use to implement a high line with their teams.

Las Palmas’s (Relatively) High Line

The above image shows Las Palmas in a mid-block, having allowed Barcelona comfortable possession until they played into the middle third.

When Barcelona broke the first line of pressure and played into their central midfielder, Las Palmas’s back four remained about 11 yards in their half.

This is just 15 yards or so from the ball.

Barcelona’s playing preference is to combine in the central area before playing one of their forwards through on goal.

The short distance between the backline and the ball condenses the space and makes it very difficult for players, even of Barcelona’s ability, to combine in this area.

As the red area highlights, the midfielders are now only being asked to cover a 10-by-20-yard box.

Triggers To Drop

The above image shows Barcelona as they are about to play a long ball in behind, having been pressed this time in a deeper position.

Las Palmas’s back line was disciplined enough to push up to the halfway line and hold their ground.

This is even with Robert Lewandowski lurking behind them, attempting to stretch the team.

Here, the offside rule is being used as an extra defender.

As highlighted in the image, the right-centre back, predicting a pass into a forward’s feet, jumps to a position where he could apply pressure.

This shows how much the backline prioritised preventing Barcelona from being able to connect in front of them over defending the space behind.

The trigger in this situation, and a key trigger in implementing a high line, is the centre-back pulling his leg back to strike the ball.

As soon as the defenders see this, they must begin to drop and ideally narrow towards their own goal.

Their body shape is vital in allowing the backline to drop efficiently.

If they can adopt a side-on-body orientation before the ball is played, it always requires them to push off on one foot to aid acceleration.

It also prevents them from having to turn 180° as the ball is played over their shoulder.

While allowing them to drop off quickly and efficiently should the ball be played behind, it also allows them to travel in the opposite direction and press players moving towards the ball.

An exception to this could be when defenders apply physical pressure on the striker who is playing with back-to-goal.

A more open, flat body shape can be used as a barrier to prevent the forward from spinning in behind.

Remaining Disciplined

This image shows Barcelona’s centre-back Ronald Araújo, from a switch of play that has taken out Las Palmas’s first line of pressure, attacking the space.

As Araújo is driving with the ball at his feet into Las Palmas’s block, the expected reaction would be, with no pressure on the ball, for the midfield and defenders to drop off and defend the space behind.

Instead, as the yellow lines show, Las Palmas maintained the same level on their defensive line until Araújo was about to release the ball.

Only when the centre-back lifted his head and pulled his leg back to play the ball in behind did the backline drop, following their runners.

As well as being disciplined in holding an effective offside line, they are also close enough to prevent through balls played along the ground.

Even for players of the quality of Barcelona’s, it is very hard to put a ball centrally, in-behind from this situation.

The almost inevitable outcome would be for the ball to roll to the goalkeeper, whose starting position in acting as a ‘sweeper’ is vital in these situations or out of play.

The only viable option is for the ball to be clipped at an angle towards the wide area.

This is what Araújo elects to do.

Here, the best possible outcome for Barcelona is achieved, with their winger, who managed to remain onside, gaining possession of the ball.

Because the ball has to travel so wide, this is still a very manageable situation for Las Palmas, who simply pack the box before a ball can be delivered.

Backline Rondo

Whilst this analysis focused on the backline itself, the midfield being able to cover space ahead of them is also of vital importance.

This 6 Vs 6 rondo can be adapted to work on either midfield pressure and cover (shown on the left) and/or the backline shifting as a unit (shown on the right).

The exercise has two teams of six divided into four separate zones.

Each team has four players across a central zone, with two players in an end zone.

The aim is for the team of four to combine before playing a pass into one of the two end players.

The two end players have two touches between them to score into the mini goals.

When the in-possession team breaks the defensive line, the defending players can attempt to recover the ball in the end zone before a goal is scored.

If the coach desires, one of the target players on the defending team can drop in after a predetermined number of passes to help regain the ball.

When working on midfield defending, the focus of the defending team should be to shift laterally and stagger their positioning.

If done correctly, this will prevent any passes from being played between them.

The ball-near player should step towards the ball when able to securely do so, with the players beside him dropping off.

This allows them to cover a lot more width whilst not allowing balls to be played between them than they could if in the same horizontal line.

When working on playing with a high backline, the aim should be for the defending four to remain as high and in as straight a line as possible in their zone, only dropping when it is required to prevent a ball from going behind them.

The defenders should be compact enough to at least make the attacking team play around, rather than through them.

As shown on the diagram, a flat line requires players to be significantly closer together than if they could adopt a diagonal line.

The coach should also emphasise appropriate body orientation.

When directly in front of the ball, the coach may demand a flat body shape to create a bigger barrier.

When further from the ball, a side-one body shape that allows the player to drop off quickly may be encouraged.

Players must learn to shift across the line quickly and recognise when to drop.

Due to the sprints required when defending, this rondo could be used as part of speed or reactive agility work at the beginning of the session.

Defending Long-Balls

This semi-unopposed exercise aims for the two sets of back fours to score points by landing an aerial ball in the end (red) zone opposite them.

The practice is designed to work on the back four shifting, dropping off and stepping up appropriately.

The two neutral players (green) represent two defensive midfielders and play for whichever team is in possession.

The six in-possession players move the ball amongst them whilst the defending four shift appropriately.

The midfielders aim to set the ball back to allow one of the defenders to play a long, high ball in behind the opposition line.

As soon as the attacking player pulls his leg back to hit the long ball, the defending team should recognise the trigger and drop off to prevent the ball from landing in the end zone.

Should the ball not be played long, the defending four should immediately push back up to their original starting position.

Players should be coached on appropriate body shape as they push, drop and shift.

To progress the exercise, a forward can be added to both teams and pressing can be done when out of possession; this player can then act as a target player.

The teams can now score an additional point if the striker receives the ball and combines with a supporting neutral player.

Now, they will be punished if the defending team drops at the wrong time or is unaware of the striker's movement.

11 Versus 11

When the session progresses to an 11 against 11, the coach should touch on the principles already worked on.

Additionally, the coach should provide the back four with a clear line that they must hold.

Poles or cones can be used as markers to guide where the backline should attempt to advance.

In the attacking phase, the backline should be encouraged to push up in relation to the ball.

For example, this can be done by implementing a rule that all players must be on or in the halfway line when a goal is scored for that goal to count.

This encourages teams to squeeze up the pitch as they attack and leaves fewer gaps between the lines for opposition teams to exploit should they lose possession.

In response to rule changes and tactical shifts, this year's tournament has been a fascinating case study in set-pieces.

New rule changes have forced tactical adaptation from corners, while long throws have emerged as a crucial method of chance creation for many teams.

As teams navigate the challenges of the biggest stage in football, they are gravitating towards set-pieces in particular.

In this World Cup tactical analysis, we will use data analysis to understand the broad set-piece themes of the group stages, and then examine the details in our set-piece analysis.

Who Are The Best Set-Piece Teams At The World Cup?

The scatter plot below, based on event data from the group stage, plots xG gained per attacking set-piece delivery against xG conceded per defensive set-piece delivery faced.

This helps to determine which teams thrive and/or struggle in both attacking set-pieces and/or defensive set-pieces.

"Set-pieces" in this context are defined by corner kicks, and free-kicks/throw-ins delivered into the 18-yard box.

For this analysis, direct free-kick chances are excluded.

2026 FIFA World Cup Attacking & Defensive Set-Piece Efficiency

By normalising per delivery, we can evaluate teams on their efficiency in defending and attacking set-pieces, not merely on volume.

A few teams stand out in particular, with Ecuador, Belgium, Argentina, and Senegal displaying elite statistics on both sides of the ball.

A few high-profile teams surprisingly show subpar defending stats, notably Portugal, Germany, and England, below the median in xGA per delivery.

Set-play strengths and vulnerabilities from the group stage will only matter more as the knockout rounds begin.

Tactical Adaptations From Corner Kicks

The past club season was defined by a progressive homogenisation of corner-kick tactics.

In the Premier League, especially, clubs gravitated towards in-swinging deliveries into an overloaded six-yard box.

In this chaos, attackers looked to block the opposing goalkeeper and pin down the defenders to create high-percentage aerial opportunities.

This "meat-wall", as it is often called disparagingly, was pioneered by clubs like Arsenal and Chelsea.

While many expected this strategy to feature prominently in the World Cup, recent IFAB rule changes have led to its decline in popularity.

The new IFAB rules allowed VAR intervention for attacking fouls committed before play has started.

The intense and aggressive contact central to "meat-wall" corners is under greater scrutiny at the World Cup, and teams are reacting by removing players from the goalmouth, taking more outswingers and short corners, and utilising deep attacking runs.

2026 FIFA World Cup Set-Piece Delivery Types By Team

In the Premier League last season, about 70% of corners were in-swinging deliveries.

Only 51.2% of corners were in-swingers in the group stage.

While short corners rates are effectively identical, the percentage of outswingers is up to 25% at the World Cup.

Some teams are clearly still favouring in-swinging deliveries, but the broader picture reflects an increase in out-swingers.

Some of this may be due to the constraints of international squads, since some teams may not have the players to take in-swingers on both sides of the pitch.

For many teams, however, it is a carefully made decision.

Even though England have multiple world-class corner takers on both sides of the pitch, Thomas Tuchel chose to implement outswingers as an integral part of their set-piece strategy.

Against Croatia's hybrid defence, England deployed an intelligent routine to create space for their star striker, Harry Kane.

They begin with Noni Madueke positioned to receive a short pass, which draws a Croatian defender out of the target area to cover the winger.

Harry Kane is positioned to make a deep run at pace toward Declan Rice's delivery.

With the running start, Kane generates a dynamic advantage against static defenders.

While Kane is making a run towards the target area, four England attackers create blocks to prevent any defenders from intercepting the cross or impeding Kane's attacking movement.

Completely uncontested due to England's attacking blocks, Harry Kane can comfortably head the ball in for a goal.

Like contemporary club set-piece tactics, this routine is heavily focused on impeding defensive movement.

While club tactics focused on creating congestion in the goalmouth, this routine aims to create space.

With the new rules, teams may be discouraged from creating the congestion that requires aggressive attacking movements to wade through a sea of defenders.

So many international teams have opted to focus on impeding defensive movements while creating space for attackers.

Outswingers are a simple method to create more space.

Since hybrid and zonal defensive setups need to cover more area against outswingers, there is naturally more space for attacking movement.

Paired with intelligent blocks, teams can create quality chances with a lower risk of committing fouls.

Germany also experimented with deeper attacking runs and blocks in a more spacious setup.

Against Curaçao, Germany placed Florian Wirtz as a short-option to draw a defender out of the box, creating more space for attacking movement.

As Nathaniel Brown takes the inswinging delivery, two German attackers run towards the delivery, attacking the defenders' blind side to catch them off guard.

Germany simultaneously deploy two blocks to restrict the movement of the defenders and create space for Nico Schlotterbeck.

Attacking the delivery unimpeded at pace, Schlotterbeck can comfortably head the ball into the back of the net for a goal.